

# Diaspora în Cercetarea Științifică și Învățământul Superior din România

*Workshop: Cultură, Drept și Dezvoltare Economică*



## Investiții străine, instituții și creștere economică

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
# Structura prezentării

- **Natura duală a investițiilor straine directe**
- **Contribuția ISD la progresul tehnic. Focus Romania**
- **ISD și acumularea de capital. Focus Europa Est**
- **Rolul mediator al instituțiilor**

Prezentarea se bazează pe rezultatele a trei articole:

1. Jude C., Leveuge G. (2016). "Growth Effect of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional Quality » *The World Economy* (2016), doi: 10.1111/twec.12402
2. Jude C. (2015) Technology Spillovers from FDI. Evidence on the Intensity of Different Spillover Channels, *The World Economy* (2015) doi: 10.1111/twec.12335
3. Jude C. (2015). "Does FDI Crowd out Domestic Investment in Transition Countries?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2301, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.

# Conceptual framework




# 1. Technology spillovers from FDI

- FDI : a viable solution to spur economic growth, through **productivity** improvements (deMello, 1997) and the associated **multiplier effect**
- Most innovation created in developed countries.
- FDI is “the cheapest” and “the most effective form” of technology transfer (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998 ; Campos and Kinoshita, 2002)
- **Channels** of technology transfer through FDI: competition, demonstration/imitation, labor mobility, inter-sectoral linkages
- Central and Eastern Europe:
  - in need of technology transfer
  - Special incentives to attract FDI. Are they justified ?

What is the direction and the intensity of FDI technological spillovers in Romania?


# How do we investigate technology spillovers ?



# Empirical analysis

- Micro level data:
  - ~2000 Romanian firms, from 33 industries (whole economy)
  - 1999-2007 period
  - 6 Input-Output tables
- Empirical analysis based on sectoral proxies for the different spillover effects
- Absorptive capacity proxied by: human capital, R&D, technological gap


# Technological spillovers from FDI in Romania



The position in the supply chain is essential !

## 2. FDI and capital accumulation

- Direct and indirect contribution to capital accumulation



- Does FDI really contribute to capital accumulation in CEE?
- Does it crowd-out or stimulate local investors?
- Do different types of FDI matter?

# Empirical framework

- Difficulty in empirically **disentangling** foreign from domestic investment (BOP statistics vs national accounts).
- FDI is not a net addition to the existing capital stock !
- Short and long run elasticities based on a dynamic investment function

$$GFCF_{it} = \alpha GFCF_{it-1} + \beta_1 GDP_{it-1} + \beta_2 INT_{it} + \beta_3 FDI_{it} + \beta_4 K_{it} + \beta_5 X_{it} + v_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Hypotheses on the effect of FDI on domestic investment:

	Short term	Long term	Impact
H1	+	+	Crowding-in
H2	+	-	Temporary crowding-in
H3	-	-	Crowding-out
H4	-	+	Creative destruction

# Data and main results

- Data for the empirical analysis:
  - Panel of 10 CEEC (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)
  - Period 1990-2010
- Results for Central and Eastern Europe :
  - *short term substitution* between FDI and domestic investment
  - the intensity of crowding-out decreases with time
  - However, *no long run complementarity* identified
- FDI seems to discourage domestic investment in CEE

# Greenfield and M&A

- FDI usually seen as a homogeneous capital flow
- However, greenfield and M&A have potentially different implications for K accumulation due to the *motivation* of foreign investors

## Greenfield FDI

- net addition to the K stock
- export oriented
- interaction on the real market

## M&A

- no immediate addition to the K stock
- locally oriented
- Interaction on the financial market

	Short-term	Long-term	Conclusion
FDI - total	-	-/0	Crowding-out
Greenfield	-	+	Creative destruction
M&A	0	0	No relationship

# The mediating role of financial development


- What *mechanism* is at work, real or financial interaction? Different policy implications
- Overall, **no significant** interaction between foreign and domestic investors on the financial market
- Financial markets in CEE are still developing. Financial interaction should be all the more present as financial markets are developed
- Financial development acts as a mediating factor **only for M&A**.
- **Conclusion:** While M&A have no independent contribution to capital accumulation, a developed financial system favors a crowding-in effect on domestic investment.

### 3. Is the growth effect of FDI conditional on institutional quality ?

- Institutional quality : an important driver in the growth process
  - ➔ *Economic problems in developing countries caused by poor institutions*
- We know that FDI inflows are attracted by better institutions (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Ali et al. 2010)
- Still, countries with the same level of FDI experience very different growth outcomes. *Why?*
- Local conditions modulate the effect of FDI on economic growth, among which *institutions*.

*Host country heterogeneity, as given by institutions, could be a plausible explanation for the inconclusive results of existing empirical studies.*

# Arguments in favor of a modulating role



- **Knowledge spillovers**

- institutions shape the relationship between foreign and domestic firms
- Direct technology transfer and property rights
- The entry mode of FDI
- The quality of FDI and the potential for spillovers
- Transaction costs and risk for long term contracts

- **Capital accumulation**

- political stability reduces the crowding-out effect
- sound financial institutions favor a crowding-in of domestic investment

# Methodology for investigating conditionality

**Assumption:** The impact of FDI on growth is not constant along the cross-sectional and the time dimensions

**Panel Smooth Transition Regression** (Gonzales et al. 2005)

- Regime-switching model allowing for a small number of extreme regimes
- The coefficient of FDI depends on a transition variable (institutions)

$$y_{it} = \mu_i + \beta_0' FDI_{it} + \beta_1' FDI_{it} g(I_{it}; \gamma, c) + \alpha' z_{it} + u_{it}$$

$$\frac{\partial y_{it}}{\partial FDI_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * g(I_{it}; \gamma, c)$$

- The values of the institutional indicator  $I_{it}$  determine the switch from a regime to another, according to a smooth transition function  $g(.)$

# Data

- **Sample:** 94 developing countries, over the period 1984- 2009
- **Institutions:** 11 indicators from the International Country Risk Guide (political risk, government stability, investment profile, internal conflicts, external conflicts, corruption, military in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, bureaucracy)
- **Control variables** (initial GDP/capita, population growth, investment, trade openness, government consumption, inflation)

# The non-linearity hypothesis

Is there a heterogeneous (nonlinear) relationship between FDI and economic growth conditional on institutional quality?

## Heterogeneous relationship

- Political risk
- Investment profile
- Internal and external conflicts
- Democratic accountability
- Bureaucracy quality
- Military in politics
- Law and order
- Ethnical tensions

## Homogeneous relationship

- Political stability
- Corruption control

# How do we interpret non-linearity?

- (1) What is the independent effect of FDI on economic growth?
- (2) What is the indirect conditional effect given a certain level of institutions?
- (3) What is the value of the threshold level of institutional quality?
- (4) Is the switch from a regime to another smooth or sudden?

Threshold variable:	Law and Order	Ethnical tensions	Democratic accountability	Bureaucracy quality
(1) $\beta_0$ : FDI	$2.4 \cdot 10^{-4}$ (0.035)	0.003 (0.036)	0.011 (0.030)	-0.062 (0.059)
(2) $\beta_1$ : $FDI \times g(q_{i,t-1}; \gamma; c_1)$	0.126*** (0.046)	0.163*** (0.063)	0.214*** (0.057)	0.212*** (0.089)
(3) Location parameter ( $c_1$ )	2.093 (0.068)	3.916 (0.077)	4.088 (0.093)	0.695 (0.247)
(4) Slope parameter ( $\gamma$ )	136.84 (6.638)	3.861 (0.634)	2.654 (0.509)	2.183 (0.936)

# Discussion (1)

- The *slope of the transition function* influences the marginal effect


Smooth transition	Sharp transition
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ethnical tensions</li><li>• democratic accountability</li><li>• bureaucracy quality</li><li>• military in politics</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• law and order</li><li>• political risk</li><li>• investment profile</li><li>• internal and external conflicts</li></ul>

- The *position* of a country along the non-linear curve of growth elasticity to FDI
- Anticipations on the evolution of the growth elasticity to FDI given by improvements in the institutional environment

## Discussion (2)


### Law & order

- an effort by a country just below the threshold value is likely to result in a sharp increase in the effect of FDI on growth





### Democratic accountability

- an effort by a country just below the threshold value is likely to result in a very gradual increase in the growth effect of FDI



The sharp/smooth transition has important implications for countries situated just below the threshold value



## Summary results

- FDI alone has no significant effect on growth in developing countries. Benefits are conditional on a sound institutional environment
- In Eastern Europe, generally situated above minimum threshold values, FDI contributes to growth essentially through technology spillovers and not capital accumulation (FDI crowds-out domestic investors).
- Most benefits are captured by local suppliers
- Financial development favors complementarities between FDI and local investors

# Policy implications

- **Sequencing** is needed in implementing economic policies: first institutional reform, second FDI attraction policies
- Potential for institutional complementarities
- **Greenfield** should be preferred to M&A, as well as local content policies

Vă mulțumesc pentru atenție